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Abstract
Abstracting Gradual Typing (AGT) is an approach to systemati-
cally deriving gradual counterparts to static type disciplines (Gar-
cia et al. 2016). The approach consists of defining the semantics of
gradual types by interpreting them as sets of static types, and then
defining an optimal abstraction back to gradual types. These opera-
tions are used to lift the static discipline to the gradual setting. The
runtime semantics of the gradual language then arises as reductions
on gradual typing derivations.
To demonstrate the flexibility of AGT, we gradualize
λSEC (Zdancewic 2002), the prototypical security-typed language,
with respect to only security labels rather than entire types, yielding
a type system that ranges gradually from simply-typed to securely-
typed. We establish noninterference for the gradual language,
called λ
S˜EC
, using Zdancewic’s logical relation proof method.
Whereas prior work presents gradual security cast languages,
which require explicit security casts, this work yields the first grad-
ual security source language, which requires no explicit casts.
1. Introduction
Gradual typing has often been viewed as a means to combine
the agility benefits of dynamic languages, like Python and Ruby
with the reliability benefits of static languages like OCaml and
Scala. This paper, in a line of work on the foundations of gradual
typing, explores the idea that static and dynamic are merely relative
notions.
This relativistic view of gradual typing is not new. Work on
gradual information flow security by Disney and Flanagan (2011)
and Fennell and Thiemann (2013) develop languages where only
information-flow security properties are subject to a mix of dy-
namic and static checking. Ban˜ados Schwerter et al. (2014) develop
a language where only computational effect capabilities are grad-
ualized. In each of these cases, the “fully-dynamic” corner of the
gradual language is not dynamic at all by typical standards, but
rather simply typed. However, those languages support seamless
migration toward a more precise typing discipline that subsumes
simple typing.
To explore this notion, we revisit the idea of gradual information-
flow security. Our tool of inquiry is a new approach to the founda-
tions of gradual typing called Abstracting Gradual Typing (AGT)
(Garcia et al. 2016). AGT is a technique for systematically deriving
gradual type systems by interpreting gradual types as sets of static
types. That work developed a traditional gradual type system with
subtyping, introducing an unknown type ?. But AGT was directly
inspired by Ban˜ados Schwerter et al. (2014), who used an early ver-
sion of these techniques to gradualize only effects. However, they
develop the dynamic semantics of gradual effects in the traditional
ad hoc fashion. Here, we bring the approach full circle, deriving a
complete static and dynamic semantics for a gradual counterpart to
the λSEC language of Zdancewic (2002).
In their simplest form, security-typed languages require values
and types to be annotated with security labels, indicating their con-
fidentiality level. The security type system guarantees noninterfer-
ence, i.e., that more-confidential information does not alter the less-
confidential results of any expression.
We prove that the resulting gradual language, called λ
S˜EC
, is
not only safe in that it never unexpectedly crashes, but that it
is sound in that it honours the information-flow invariants of the
precisely typed terms. The former property is unsurprising, since
even the most imprecisely typed program still maintains the simple
typing discipline, which is enough to establish the safety of the
operational semantics. The soundness of the language with respect
to the security type discipline, i.e., that basic information flow
properties are respected, is the key property.
The prior work in gradual security typing developed gradual
cast languages, which require explicit type casts to connect impre-
cisely typed terms with precisely typed terms. This is akin to the in-
termediate languages of traditional gradually-typed languages. This
work presents the first gradual source language, where no explicit
casts are needed: they are introduced by the language semantics.
Furthermore, following the AGT approach, the runtime semantics
are induced by the proof of type safety for λSEC, yielding a crisp
connection to that precise static type discipline.
As with the original work on AGT, we can straightforwardly
establish proper adaptations of the refined criteria for gradually
typed languages. We will do so in this ongoing work.
Ultimately this work views gradual typing as a theory of impre-
cise typing rather than dynamic checking. Indeed dynamic check-
ing is an inevitable consequence of this approach, but the focus here
is on the types and their meaning. We believe that this broader view
of gradual typing can widen the reach of gradual typing beyond
its current niche of interest among dynamic language enthusiasts.
Furthermore, we believe that AGT generalizes the foundations of
gradual typing enough to support a wide variety of gradual type
disciplines.
2. The Static Language: λSEC
We first present the λSEC language, with some differences from the
original presentation (Zdancewic 2002). The most notable changes
are that the type system is syntax directed, and the runtime seman-
tics are small-step structural operational semantics rather than big-
step natural semantics.
Figure 1 presents the syntax and type system for λSEC. The lan-
guage extends a simple typing discipline with a lattice of security
labels ℓ. All program values are ascribed security labels, which are
partial ordered 4 from low security to high-security and include
top and bottom security labels ⊤ and ⊥. The λSEC types S extend
ℓ ∈ LABEL, S ∈ TYPE, x ∈ VAR, b ∈ BOOL, ⊕ ∈ BOOLOP
t ∈ TERM, r ∈ RAWVALUE v ∈ VALUE Γ ∈ VAR fin⇀ TYPE
S ::= Boolℓ | S →ℓ S (types)
b ::= true | false (Booleans)
r ::= b | λx : S.t (raw values)
v ::= rℓ (values)
t ::= v | t t | t⊕ t | if t then t else t | t :: S (terms)
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ | =⇒ (operations)
Γ ⊢ t : S
(Sx) x : S ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ x : S
(Sb)
Γ ⊢ bℓ : Boolℓ
(Sλ) Γ, x : S1 ⊢ t : S2
Γ ⊢ (λx : S1.t)ℓ : S1 →ℓ S2
(S⊕)
Γ ⊢ t1 : Boolℓ1 Γ ⊢ t2 : Boolℓ2
Γ ⊢ t1 ⊕ t2 : Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
(Sapp) Γ ⊢ t1 : S11 →ℓ S12 Γ ⊢ t2 : S2 S2 <: S11
Γ ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
(Sif) Γ ⊢ t : Boolℓ Γ ⊢ t1 : S1 Γ ⊢ t2 : S2
Γ ⊢ if t then t1 else t2 : (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ
(S::) Γ ⊢ t : S1 S1 <: S2
Γ ⊢ t :: S2 : S2
S <: S
ℓ 4 ℓ′
Boolℓ <: Boolℓ′
S′1 <: S1 S2 <: S
′
2 ℓ 4 ℓ
′
S1 →ℓ S2 <: S
′
1 →ℓ′ S
′
2
S <
:
S, S
<
: S
<
:
: TYPE× TYPE ⇀ TYPE
Boolℓ <
:
Boolℓ′ = Bool(ℓ ≺ℓ′)
(S11 →ℓ S12) <
:
(S21 →ℓ′ S22) = (S11
<
: S21)→(ℓ ≺ℓ′) (S12 <
:
S22)
S <
:
S undefined otherwise
<
: : TYPE× TYPE ⇀ TYPE
Boolℓ
<
: Boolℓ′ = Bool(ℓ
≺
ℓ′)
(S11 →ℓ S12)
<
: (S21 →ℓ′ S22) = (S11 <
:
S21)→(ℓ
≺
ℓ′) (S12
<
: S22)
S
<
: S undefined otherwise
Figure 1. λSEC: Syntax and Static Semantics
a simple type discipline by associating a security label to each type
constructor.
Rules for variables, constants and functions are straightforward.
The (S⊕) rule for binary boolean operations ensures that the con-
fidentiality of combining two values is the least upper bound, or
join ≺, of the confidentiality of the two sub-expressions. Similarly,
when applying a function (Sapp), the result type joins the label of
the function’s result type S12 with the label ℓ of the function type.
For this, the rule uses a notion of label stamping on types:1
Boolℓ ≺ ℓ
′ = Bool(ℓ ≺ℓ′)
(S1 →ℓ S2) ≺ ℓ
′ = S1 →(ℓ ≺ℓ′) S2
Rule (Sapp) also appeals to a notion of subtyping S <: S. Sub-
typing is induced by the ordering on security labels. It allows lower-
security values to flow to higher-security contexts, but not vice-
1 We overload the join notation ≺ throughout, and rely on the context to
disambiguate.
t ::= . . . | t ≺ ℓ (term stamping)
f ::= ⊕ t | v ⊕ |  t | v  (frames)
if  then t else t |  ≺ ℓ
(S ≺) Γ ⊢ t : S
Γ ⊢ t ≺ ℓ : S ≺ ℓ
t −→ t Notions of Reduction
b1ℓ1 ⊕ b2ℓ2 −→ (b1 J⊕K b2)(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
(λx : S.t)ℓ v −→ ([v/x]t) ≺ ℓ
if trueℓ then t1 else t2 −→ t1 ≺ ℓ
if falseℓ then t1 else t2 −→ t2 ≺ ℓ
rℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 −→ r(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2)
t 7−→ t Reduction
t1 −→ t2
t1 7−→ t2
t1 7−→ t2
f [t1] 7−→ f [t2]
Figure 2. λSEC: Small-Step Dynamic Semantics
versa. Rule (Sif) specifies that the type of a conditional is the sub-
typing join <: of the types of the branches, further stamped to incor-
porate the confidentiality of the predicate expression’s label l. The
latter is necessary to forbid indirect flow of information through
the conditional. As usual, the join of two function types is defined
in terms of the meet
<
: of the argument types, which in turn relies
on the label meet operator ≺ . The (S::) rule introduces ascription,
which can move the type of an expression to any supertype.
These syntax-directed typing rules define a type system that is
sound and complete with respect to Zdancewic’s. The following
propositions use ⊢Z for the type system of Zdancewic (2002), and
consider only terms without ascription (i.e., the common subset of
the two systems).
Proposition 1. If Γ ⊢ t : S then Γ ⊢Z t : S.
Proof. By induction on Γ ⊢ t : S.
Proposition 2. If Γ ⊢Z t : S Then Γ ⊢ t : S′ for some S′ <: S.
Proof. By induction on Γ ⊢Z t : S.
Dynamic semantics. The dynamic semantics of λSEC were orig-
inally presented as big step semantics (Zdancewic 2002). Figure 2
presents the equivalent small-step semantics. Of particular inter-
est is the new label stamping form on terms, which we call term
stamping t ≺ ℓ. Term stamping allows small-step reduction to retain
security information that is merged with the resulting value of the
nested term.
This small-step semantics coincides with the big-step semantics
of λSEC (Zdancewic 2002). Note that we establish the equivalence
to the source λSEC language (Figure 1), i.e., without term stamping,
since it is only needed internally to support small-step reduction.
As usual, 7−→∗ denotes the reflexive, transitive closure of 7−→.
Proposition 3. t ⇓ v if and only if t 7−→∗ v.
Proof.
Case (only if). By induction on t ⇓ v, using the admissibility of
the ⇓ rules in 7−→∗.
Case (if). By induction on the length of the reduction t 7−→∗ v.
Straightforward case analysis on t using the admissibility of the
inversion lemmas for ⇓ in 7−→∗.
3. Gradualizing λSEC
In gradualizing λSEC, we could decide to support unknown informa-
tion in both types and security labels. Here, to show the flexibility
of the AGT approach, we gradualize λSEC only in terms of secu-
rity labels, thereby supporting a gradual evolution between simply-
typed programs and securely-typed programs.
3.1 Meaning of Unknown Security Type Information
To gradualize our security types, we introduce a notion of gradual
labels and define their meanings in terms of concrete labels of a
given security lattice.
Definition 1 (Gradual labels). A gradual label ℓ˜ is either a label ℓ
or the unknown label ?.
ℓ˜ ∈ GLABEL
ℓ˜ ::= ℓ | ? (gradual labels)
As with static security typing, we develop gradual security types
by assigning a gradual label to every type constructor.
Definition 2 (Gradual security type). A gradual security type is a
gradual type labeled with a gradual label:
S˜ ∈ GTYPE
S˜ ::= Boolℓ˜ | S˜ →ℓ˜ S˜ (gradual types)
To give meaning to gradual security types, we use the AGT
approach of defining a concretization function that maps gradual
security types to sets of static security types. This concretization is
the natural lifting of a concretization for gradual labels.
Definition 3 (Label Concretization). Let γℓ : GLABEL → P(LABEL)
be defined as follows:
γℓ(ℓ) = { ℓ }
γℓ(?) = LABEL
We give meaning to the unknown label by saying that it represents
any label. On the other hand, any static label represents only itself.
Since we are operating on complete lattices, the sound and
optimal abstraction function from sets of labels to gradual labels
is fully determined by the concretization. We characterize it below.
Definition 4 (Label Abstraction). Letαℓ : P(LABEL)→ GLABEL
be defined as follows:
αℓ({ ℓ }) = ℓ
αℓ(∅) is undefined
αℓ(Ûℓ) = ? otherwise
Proposition 4 (αℓ is Sound). If Ûℓ is not empty, then Ûℓ ⊆ γℓ(αℓ(Ûℓ)).
Proof. By case analysis on the structure of Ûℓ. If Ûℓ = { ℓ } then
γℓ(αℓ({ ℓ })) = γℓ(ℓ) = { ℓ } = Ûℓ, otherwise
γℓ(αℓ(Ûℓ)) = γℓ(?) = LABEL ⊇ Ûℓ.
Proposition 5 (αℓ is Optimal). If Ûℓ ⊆ γℓ(ℓ˜) then αℓ(Ûℓ) ⊑ ℓ˜.
Proof. By case analysis on the structure of ℓ˜. If ℓ˜ = ℓ, γℓ(ℓ˜) =
{ ℓ }; Ûℓ ⊆ { ℓ } ,Ûℓ 6= ∅ implies αℓ(Ûℓ) = αℓ({ ℓ }) = ℓ ⊑ ℓ˜ (ifÛℓ = ∅, αℓ(Ûℓ) is undefined). If ℓ˜ = ?, ℓ˜′ ⊑ ℓ˜ for all ℓ˜′.
Having defined the meaning of gradual labels, we define the
meaning of gradual security types via concretization.
Definition 5 (Type Concretization). Let γS : GTYPE → P(TYPE)
be defined as follows:
γS(Boolℓ˜) = {Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γℓ(ℓ˜) }
γS(S˜ →ℓ˜ S˜) =
 ˇ
γS(S˜1)→γℓ(ℓ˜) γS(S˜2)
where  ¸ÛS1 →Ûℓ ÛS2 = {S1 →ℓ S2 | Si ∈ γS(ÛSi), ℓ ∈ Ûℓ } .
With concretization of security type, we can now define security
type precision.
Definition 6 (Label and Type Precision).
1. ℓ˜1 is less imprecise than ℓ˜2, notation ℓ˜1 ⊑ ℓ˜2, if and only if
γℓ(ℓ˜1) ⊆ γℓ(ℓ˜2); inductively:
ℓ˜ ⊑ ? ℓ˜ ⊑ ℓ˜
2. S˜1 is less imprecise than S˜2, notation S˜1 ⊑ S˜2, if and only if
γS(S˜1) ⊆ γS(S˜2); inductively:
ℓ˜1 ⊑ ℓ˜2
Boolℓ˜1 ⊑ Boolℓ˜2
S˜11 ⊑ S˜21 S˜12 ⊑ S˜22
ℓ˜1 ⊑ ℓ˜2
S˜11 →ℓ˜1 S˜12 ⊑ S˜21 →ℓ˜2 S˜22
We now define the abstraction function.
Definition 7 (Type Abstraction). Let the abstraction function αS :
P(TYPE)→ GTYPE be defined as:
αS({Boolℓi }) = Boolαℓ({ ℓi })
αS({Si1 →ℓi Si2 }) = αS({Si1 })→αℓ({ ℓi })
αS({Si2 })
αS(ÛT ) is undefined otherwise
We can only abstract valid sets of security types, i.e. in which
elements only defer by security labels.
Definition 8 (Valid Type Sets).
valid({Boolℓi })
valid({Si1 }) valid({Si2 })
valid({ (Si1 → Si2)ℓi })
Proposition 6 (αS is Sound).
If valid(ÛS) then ÛS ⊆ γS(αS(ÛS)).
Proof. By well-founded induction on ÛS according to the ordering
relation ÛS < ÛS defined as follows:
d¯om(ÛS) < ÛS
cˆod(ÛS) < ÛS
Where d¯om, cˆod : P(GTYPE) → P(GType) are the collecting
liftings of the domain and codomain functions dom, cod respec-
tively, e.g.,
d¯om(ÛS) = { dom(S) | S ∈ ÛS } .
We then consider cases on ÛS according to the definition of αS .
Case ({Boolℓi }).
γS(αS({Boolℓi })) = γS(Boolαℓ({ ℓi })
)
= {Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γℓ(αℓ({ ℓi })) }
⊇ {Boolℓi } by soundness of αℓ.
Case ({Si1 →ℓi Si2 }).
γS(αS({Si1 →ℓi Si2 }))
= γS(αS({Si1 })→αℓ({ ℓi })
αS({Si2 }))
= γS(αS({Si1 })→γℓ(αℓ({ ℓi }))
γS(αS({Si2 }))
⊇ {Si1 →ℓi Si2 }
by induction hypotheses on {Si1 } and {Si2 }, and soundness of
αℓ.
Proposition 7 (αS is Optimal). If valid(ÛS) and ÛS ⊆ γS(S˜) then
αS(ÛS) ⊑ S˜.
Proof. By induction on the structure of S˜.
Case (Boolℓ˜). γS(Boolℓ˜) = {Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ γℓ(ℓ˜) }
So ÛS = {Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ Ûℓ } for some Ûℓ ⊆ γℓ(ℓ˜). By optimality of αℓ,
αℓ(Ûℓ) ⊑ ℓ˜, so αS({Boolℓ | ℓ ∈ Ûℓ }) = Bool
αℓ(Ûℓ) ⊑ Boolℓ˜.
Case (S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2). γS(S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2) =  ˇγS(S˜1)→γℓ(ℓ˜) γS(S˜2).
So ÛS = {S1i →li S2i }, with {S1i } ⊆ γS(S˜1),
{S1i } ⊆ γS(S˜2), and { li } ⊆ γℓ(ℓ˜). By induction hypotheses,
αS({S1i }) ⊑ S˜1 and αS({S2i }) ⊑ S˜2, and by optimality of αℓ,
αℓ({ li }) ⊑ ℓ˜. Hence αS({S1i →li S2i }) =
αS({S1i })→αℓ({ li })
αS({S2i }) ⊑ S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2.
3.2 Consistent Predicates and Operators
Following the AGT approach, we lift predicates on labels and types
to consistent predicates on the corresponding gradual labels and
gradual types. Consistent predicates hold if some member of the
collecting semantics satisfies the corresponding static predicate. We
lift partial functions to gradual partial functions, as per the standard
approach in abstract interpretation.
Definition 9 (Consistent label ordering). ℓ˜1 4˜ ℓ˜2 if and only if
ℓ1 4 ℓ2 for some (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γℓ(ℓ˜1)× γℓ(ℓ˜2).
Algorithmically:
? 4˜ ℓ˜ ℓ˜ 4˜ ?
ℓ1 4 ℓ2
ℓ1 4˜ ℓ2
Definition 10 (Gradual label join).
ℓ˜1 ˜≺ ℓ˜2 = αℓ({ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 | (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γℓ(ℓ˜1)× γℓ(ℓ˜2) }).
Algorithmically:
⊤ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ⊤ = ⊤
ℓ˜ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ℓ˜ = ? if ℓ˜ 6= ⊤
ℓ1 ˜≺ ℓ2 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2
Both gradual label stamping and gradual join of security types
are obtained by lifting their corresponding static operations:
Definition 11 (Gradual label meet).
ℓ˜1 ˜≺ ℓ˜2 = αℓ({ ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2 | (ℓ1, ℓ2) ∈ γℓ(ℓ˜1)× γℓ(ℓ˜2) }).
Algorithmically:
⊥ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ⊥ = ⊥
ℓ˜ ˜≺ ? = ? ˜≺ ℓ˜ = ? if ℓ˜ 6= ⊥
ℓ1 ˜≺ ℓ2 = ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2
We now lift subtyping to gradual security types.
Definition 12 (Consistent subtyping). S˜1 . S˜2 if and only if
S1 <: S2 for some (S1, S2) ∈ γS(S˜1)× γS(S˜2)
3.3 Gradual Security Type System
The gradual security type system is adapted from Figure 1 by lifting
static types and labels to gradual types and labels, lifting partial
functions on static types to partial functions on gradual types, and
lifting predicates on types and labels to consistent predicates on
gradual types and labels.
The AGT approach yields a gradual counterpart to an underly-
ing static type system that satisfies a number of desirable proper-
ties. To state these properties, the following propositions use ⊢S to
denote the λSEC typing relation of Figure 1.
Proposition 8 (Conservative Extension). For t ∈ TERM,
⊢S t : S if and only if ⊢ t : S
Proof. By induction over the typing derivations. The proof is trivial
because static types are given singleton meanings via concretiza-
tion.
In the following proposition, precision on terms t˜1 ⊑ t˜2 is the
natural lifting of type precision to terms.
Proposition 9 (Static gradual guarantee). If ⊢ t˜1 : S˜1 and t˜1 ⊑ t˜2,
then ⊢ t˜2 : S˜2 and S˜1 ⊑ S˜2.
Proof. Corollary of the corresponding proposition for open terms.
By induction on typing derivation of Γ ⊢ t˜1 : S˜1 using the
definition of t˜1 ⊑ t˜2.
3.4 Dynamic Semantics of Gradual Security Typing
Interiors of consistent subtyping and label ordering. The inte-
rior of a consistent judgment expresses the most precise deducible
information about a consistent judgment. We define the interior of
a judgment in terms of our abstraction.
Definition 13 (Interior). Let P be a binary predicate on static
types. Then the interior of the judgment P˜ (T˜1, T˜2), notation
IP (T˜1, T˜2), is the smallest tuple 〈T˜ ′1, T˜ ′2〉 ⊑2 〈T˜1, T˜2〉 such that
for 〈T1, T2〉 ∈ TYPE2, if 〈T1, T2〉 ∈ γ2(T˜1, T˜2) and P (T1, T2),
then 〈T1, T2〉 ∈ γ2(T˜ ′1, T˜ ′2).
It is formalized as follows:
IP (T˜1, T˜2) = α
2({ 〈T1, T2〉 ∈ γ
2(T˜1, T˜2) | P (T1, T2) }).
We use case-based analysis to calculate the algorithmic rules for
the interior of consistent subtyping on gradual security types:
I4(ℓ˜1, ℓ˜2) = 〈ℓ˜
′
1, ℓ˜
′
2〉
I<:(Boolℓ˜1 ,Boolℓ˜2) = 〈Boolℓ˜′1
,Boolℓ˜′
2
〉
I<:(S˜21, S˜11) = 〈S˜
′
21, S˜
′
11〉 I<:(S˜12, S˜22) = 〈S˜
′
12, S˜
′
22〉
I4(ℓ˜1, ℓ˜2) = 〈ℓ˜
′
1, ℓ˜
′
2〉
I<:(S˜11 →ℓ˜1 S˜12, S˜21 →ℓ˜2 S˜22) = 〈S˜
′
11 →ℓ˜′
1
S˜′12, S˜
′
21 →ℓ˜′
2
S˜′22〉
ℓ˜ ∈ GLABEL, S˜ ∈ GTYPE, x ∈ VAR, b ∈ BOOL, ⊕ ∈ BOOLOP
t˜ ∈ GTERM, r ∈ RAWVALUE v ∈ VALUE Γ ∈ VAR fin⇀ GTYPE
S˜ ::= Bool
ℓ˜
| S˜ →
ℓ˜
S˜ (gradual types)
b ::= true | false (Booleans)
r ::= b | λx : S˜.˜t (base values)
v ::= rℓ (values)
t˜ ::= v | t˜ t˜ | t˜⊕ t˜ | if t˜ then t˜ else t˜ (terms)
⊕ ::= ∧ | ∨ | =⇒ (operations)
Γ ⊢ t : S
(S˜x) x : S˜ ∈ Γ
Γ ⊢ x : S˜
(S˜b)
Γ ⊢ b
ℓ˜
: Bool
ℓ˜
(S˜λ) Γ, x : S˜1 ⊢ t˜ : S˜2
Γ ⊢ (λx : S˜1 .˜t)ℓ˜ : S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2
(S˜⊕)
Γ ⊢ t˜1 : Boolℓ˜1
Γ ⊢ t˜2 : Boolℓ˜2
Γ ⊢ t˜1 ⊕ t˜2 : Bool
ℓ˜1˜≺ ℓ˜2
(S˜app)
Γ ⊢ t˜1 : S˜11 →ℓ˜ S˜12 Γ ⊢ t˜2 : S˜2 S˜2 . S˜11
Γ ⊢ t˜1 t˜2 : S˜12 ˜≺ ℓ˜
(S˜if)
Γ ⊢ t˜ : Bool
ℓ˜
Γ ⊢ t˜1 : S˜1 Γ ⊢ t˜2 : S˜2
Γ ⊢ if t˜ then t˜1 else t˜2 : (S˜1
˜
<
:
S˜2)˜≺ ℓ˜
(S˜::) Γ ⊢ t : S˜1 S˜1 . S˜2
Γ ⊢ t :: S˜2 : S˜2
S˜ . S˜
ℓ˜ 4˜ ℓ˜′
Bool
ℓ˜
. Bool
ℓ˜′
S˜′1 . S˜1 S˜2 . S˜
′
2 ℓ˜ 4˜ ℓ˜
′
S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2 . S˜
′
1 →ℓ˜′ S˜
′
2
S˜<:S, S˜<: S
˜
<
:
: GTYPE× GTYPE ⇀ GTYPE
Bool
ℓ˜
˜
<
:
Bool
ℓ˜′
= Bool
(ℓ˜˜≺ ℓ˜′)
(S˜11 →ℓ˜ S˜12)
˜
<
:
(S˜21 →ℓ˜′ S˜22) = (S˜11˜<: S˜21)→(ℓ˜˜≺ ℓ˜′) (S˜12˜<:S˜22)
S˜˜<:S˜ undefined otherwise
˜<: : GTYPE× GTYPE ⇀ GTYPE
Bool
ℓ˜
˜<: Bool
ℓ˜′
= Bool(ℓ˜
≺
ℓ˜′)
(S˜11 →ℓ˜ S˜12)˜<: (S˜21 →ℓ˜′ S˜22) = (S˜11˜<:S˜21)→(ℓ˜˜≺ ℓ˜′) (S˜12˜<: S˜22)
S˜˜<: S˜ undefined otherwise
Figure 3. λ
S˜EC
: Syntax and Static Semantics
The rules appeal to the algorithmic rules for the interior of
consistent label ordering, calculated similarly:
ℓ 6= ⊤
I4(ℓ, ?) = 〈ℓ, ?〉 I4(⊤, ?) = 〈⊤,⊤〉
ℓ 6= ⊥
I4(?, ℓ) = 〈?, ℓ〉 I4(?,⊥) = 〈⊥,⊥〉
I4(ℓ˜, ℓ˜) = 〈ℓ˜, ℓ˜〉
xS˜ ∈ TERM
S˜
b
ℓ˜
∈ TERMBool
ℓ˜
tS˜2 ∈ TERM
S˜2
(λxS˜1 .tS˜2 )
ℓ˜
∈ TERM
S˜1→ℓ˜
S˜2
tS˜1 ∈ TERM
S˜1
ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . Boolℓ˜1
tS˜2 ∈ TERM
S˜2
ε2 ⊢ S˜2 . Boolℓ˜2
ε1t
S˜1 ⊕ℓ˜1˜≺ ℓ˜2 ε2tS˜2 ∈ TERMBool
ℓ˜1˜≺ℓ˜2
tS˜1 ∈ TERM
S˜1
ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . S˜11 →ℓ˜ S˜12
tS˜2 ∈ TERM
S˜2
ε2 ⊢ S˜2 . S˜11
ε1t
S˜1 @
S˜11→ℓ˜
S˜12 ε2t
S˜2 ∈ TERM
S˜12˜≺ ℓ˜
tS˜1 ∈ TERM
S˜1
ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . Boolℓ˜1
tS˜2 ∈ TERM
S˜2
ε2 ⊢ S˜2 . (S˜2 ˜≺ S˜3)˜≺ ℓ˜1
tS˜3 ∈ TERM
S˜3
ε3 ⊢ S˜3 . (S˜2 ˜≺ S˜3)˜≺ ℓ˜1
if ε1t
S˜1 then ε2t
S˜2 else ε3t
S˜3 ∈ TERM
(S˜2
˜
<
:
S˜3)˜≺ ℓ˜1
tS˜1 ∈ TERM
S˜1
ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . S˜2
ε1t
S˜1 :: S˜2 ∈ TERM
S˜2
Figure 4. λ
S˜EC
: Gradual Intrinsic Terms
Intrinsic terms. Fig. 4 presents the intrinsic terms for λ
S˜EC
. Note
that we do not need to introduce term stamping in this language.
Since terms are intrinsically typed and we have ascriptions, labels
can be stamped at the type level.
Reduction. Evaluation uses the consistent transitivity operator
◦<: to combine evidences:
〈S˜1, S˜21〉 ◦
<: 〈S˜22, S˜3〉 = △
<:(S˜1, S˜21 ⊓ S˜22, S˜3)
First we calculate a recursive meet operator for gradual types:
Boolℓ˜ ⊓ Boolℓ˜′ = Boolℓ˜⊓ℓ˜′
(S˜11 →ℓ˜ S˜12) ⊓ (S˜21 →ℓ˜′ S˜22) = (S˜11 ⊓ S˜21)→ℓ˜⊓ℓ˜′ (S˜12 ⊓ S˜22)
S˜ ⊓ S˜′ undefined otherwise
where ℓ˜ ⊓ ℓ˜′ = αℓ(γℓ(ℓ˜) ∩ γℓ(ℓ˜′)), or algorithmically:
ℓ˜ ⊓ ? = ? ⊓ ℓ˜ = ℓ˜
ℓ ⊓ ℓ = ℓ
ℓ ⊓ ℓ′ undefined otherwise
We calculate a recursive definition for △<: by case analysis on
the structure of the second argument,
△4(ℓ˜1, ℓ˜2, ℓ˜3) = 〈ℓ˜1, ℓ˜3〉
△<:(Boolℓ˜1 ,Boolℓ˜2 ,Boolℓ˜3) = 〈Boolℓ˜1 ,Boolℓ˜3〉
△<:(S˜31, S˜21, S˜11) = 〈S˜31, S˜11〉
△<:(S˜12, S˜22, S˜32) = 〈S˜12, S˜32〉
△4(ℓ˜1, ℓ˜2, ℓ˜3) = 〈ℓ˜1, ℓ˜3〉
△<:(S˜11 →ℓ˜1 S˜12, S˜21 →ℓ˜2 S˜22, S˜31 →ℓ˜3 S˜32)
= 〈S˜11 →ℓ˜1 S˜12, S˜31 →ℓ˜3 S˜32〉
with the following definition of △4, again calculated by case
analysis on the middle gradual label:
⊤ 4˜ ℓ˜3
△4(ℓ˜1,⊤, ℓ˜3) = 〈ℓ˜1,⊤〉
ℓ˜1 4˜ ⊥
△4(ℓ˜1,⊥, ℓ˜3) = 〈⊥, ℓ˜3〉
ℓ˜1 4˜ ℓ˜2 ℓ˜2 4˜ ℓ˜3 ℓ˜2 6∈ {⊥,⊤}
△4(ℓ˜1, ℓ˜2, ℓ˜3) = 〈ℓ˜1, ℓ˜3〉
The reduction rules are given in Fig. 5. The evidence inversion
functions reflect the contravariance on arguments and the need to
stamp security labels on return types:
idom(〈S˜′1 →ℓ˜′ S˜
′
2, S˜
′
1 →ℓ˜′′ S˜
′′
2 〉) = 〈S˜
′′
1 , S˜
′
1〉
icod(〈S˜′1 →ℓ˜′ S˜
′
2, S˜
′′
1 →ℓ˜′′ S˜
′′
2 〉) = 〈S˜
′
2 ˜≺ ℓ˜′, S˜′′2 ˜≺ ℓ˜′′〉
3.5 Example
Consider a simple lattice with two confidentiality levels, L = ⊥
and H = ⊤, and the following extrinsic program definitions:
f , (λx : BoolL.x)L a public channel
g , (λx : Bool?.x)L an unknown channel
that can be publicly used
v , falseH a private value
f v does not type check, but f (g v) does typecheck, even though
it fails at runtime. Type checking yields the corresponding intrinsic
definitions:
(〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f) @
S˜f
(
〈L, L〉 (〈S˜g, S˜g〉 g) @
S˜g (〈H,H〉 v))
)
where the intrinsic subterms are essentially identical to their extrin-
sic counterparts:
f , (λxBoolL .x)L a public channel
g , (λxBool? .x)L an unknown channel
that can be publicly used
v , falseH a private value
For conciseness, we abbreviate Boolℓ˜ with ℓ˜, use S˜f and S˜g to
refer to the types of f and g, and elide the application operators
@S˜ . At each step, we use grey boxes to highlight the focus of
reduction/rewriting, and underline the result.
ε ∈ EVIDENCE, et ∈ EVTERM, ev ∈ EVVALUE, u ∈ SIMPLEVALUE,
t ∈ TERM∗, v ∈ VALUE, g ∈ EVFRAME, f ∈ TMFRAME
ε ::= 〈S˜, S˜〉
et ::= εt
ev ::= εu
u ::= x | b
ℓ˜
| (λx.t)
ℓ˜
v ::= u | εu :: S˜
g ::= ⊕ℓ˜ et | ev ⊕ℓ˜  | @S˜ et | ev @S˜  |  :: S˜
| if  then et else et
f ::= g[ε]
Notions of Reduction
−→: TERM
S˜
× (TERM
S˜
∪ { error })
〈Bool
ℓ˜′
1
,Bool
ℓ˜′′
1
〉 (b1)ℓ˜1
⊕ℓ˜ 〈Bool
ℓ˜′
2
,Bool
ℓ˜′′
2
〉 (b2)ℓ˜2
−→
〈Bool
(ℓ˜′
1
˜≺ ℓ˜′2),Bool(ℓ˜′′1˜≺ ℓ˜′′2 )〉 (b1 J⊕K b2)(ℓ˜1˜≺ ℓ˜2) :: Boolℓ˜
ε1(λx
S˜11 .t∗)
ℓ˜1
@
S˜1→ℓ˜
S˜2 ε2u −→ß
icod(ε1)([((ε2 ◦
<: idom(ε1))u :: S˜11)/x
S˜1 ]t∗) :: S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜
error if (ε2 ◦<: idom(ε1)) not defined
if ε1bℓ˜ then ε2t
S˜2 else ε3t
S˜3 −→®
ε2t
S˜2 :: (S˜2
˜
<
:
S˜3)˜≺ ℓ˜ b = true
ε3t
S˜3 :: (S˜2
˜
<
:
S˜3)˜≺ ℓ˜ b = false
−→c: EVTERM× (EVTERM ∪ { error })
ε1(ε2v :: S˜) −→c
ß
(ε2 ◦
<: ε1)v
error if not defined
Reduction
7−→: TERM
S˜
× (TERM
S˜
∪ { error })
(R−→)
tS˜ −→ r r ∈ (TERM
S˜
∪ { error })
tS˜ 7−→ r
(Rg) et −→c et
′
g[et ] 7−→ g[r]
(Rgerr) et −→c error
g[et ] 7−→ error
(Rf )
tS˜1 7−→ t
S˜
2
f [tS˜1 ] 7−→ f [t
S˜
2 ]
(Rferr)
tS˜1 7−→ error
f [tS˜1 ] 7−→ error
Figure 5. λ
S˜EC
: Intrinsic Reduction
(〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 ((〈S˜g , S˜g〉 g ) (〈H,H〉 v))
)
= (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 ( (〈S˜g , S˜g〉 (λx?.x)
S˜g
L
) (〈H,H〉 v) )
)
−→ (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 (?, ?([ (〈H,H〉 ◦<: 〈?, ?〉) v :: ?/x]x) :: ?)
)
=◦<: (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 (?, ?( [〈H,H〉v :: ?/x]x ) :: ?)
)
=[t/t]t (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 ( ?, ?(〈H,H〉 v :: ?) :: ?)
)
−→c (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 ( (〈H,H〉 ◦<: 〈?, ?〉) v :: ?)
)
=◦<: (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
〈L, L〉 (〈H,H〉v :: ?)
)
−→c (〈S˜f , S˜f 〉 f)
(
error
)
because 〈H,H〉 ◦<: 〈L, L〉 = △<:(H,H ⊓ L, L)
which is undefined because H ⊓ L is undefined.
4. Noninterference for λS˜EC
We establish noninterference for the gradual security language
using logical relations, adapting the technique from Zdancewic
(2002).
First, in the intrinsic setting, the type environment related to an
open term t is simply the set of (intrinsically-typed) free variables
of the term, FV (t). We use the metavariable Γ ∈ P(VAR∗) to
denote such “type-environments-as-sets”.
Informally, the noninterference theorem states that a program
with low (visible) output and a high (private) input can be run with
different high-security values and, if terminating, will always yield
the same observable value.2
Theorem 10 (Noninterference). if t ∈ TERMBool
ℓ˜
with FV (t) =
{x } , x ∈ TERM
S˜
, and v1, v2 ∈ TERM
S˜
with label(S˜) 64˜ ℓ˜, then
t[v1/x] 7−→
∗ v′1 ∧ t[v2/x] 7−→
∗ v′2 ⇒ bval(v
′
1) = bval(v
′
2)
Proof. The result follows by using the method of logical relations
(following Zdancewic (2002)), as a special case of Lemma 15
below.
Note that we compare equality of bare values at base types,
stripping the checking-related information (labels, evidences and
ascriptions): i.e. bval(bℓ˜) = b and bval(εbℓ˜ :: S˜) = b. Also,
gradual programs can fail. We establish termination-insensitive
noninterference, meaning in particular that any program may run
into an error without violating noninterference.
Definition 14 (Gradual security logical relations). For an arbitrary
element ζ of the security lattice, the ζ-level gradual security re-
lations are type-indexed binary relations on closed terms defined
inductively as presented in Figure 6. The notation v1 ≈ζ v2 : S˜
indicates that v1 is related to v2 at type S˜ when observed at the
security level ζ. Similarly, the notation t1 ≈ζ t2 : C(S˜) indicates
that t1 and t2 are related computations that produce related values
at type S˜ when observed at the security level ζ.
The logical relations are very similar to those of Zdancewic
(2002), except for the points discussed above and the fact that we
account for subtyping in the relation between values at a function
type (recall that our type system is syntax-directed).
Definition 15 (Secure program). A well-typed program t that pro-
duces a ζ-observable output of type S˜ (i.e. label(S˜) 4˜ ζ) is secure
iff t ≈ζ t : C(S˜).
Definition 16 (Related substitutions). Two substitutions σ1 and σ2
are related, notation Γ ⊢ σ1 ≈ζ σ2, if σi |= Γ and
∀xS˜ ∈ Γ.σ1(x
S˜) ≈ζ σ2(x
S˜) : S˜.
Lemma 11 (Substitution preserves typing). If tS˜ ∈ TERM
S˜
and
σ |= FV (tS˜) then σ(tS˜) ∈ TERM
S˜
.
Proof. By induction on the derivation of tS˜ ∈ TERM
S˜
Lemma 12 (Reduction preserves relations). Consider t1, t2 ∈
TERM
S˜
. Posing ti 7−→∗ t′i, we have t1 ≈ζ t2 : C(S˜) if and only if
t′1 ≈ζ t
′
2 : C(S˜)
2 The label function returns the top-level security label of the given type:
label(Bool
ℓ˜
) = ℓ˜ and label(S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2) = ℓ˜.
Proof. Direct by definition of t1 ≈ζ t2 : C(S˜) and transitivity of
7−→∗.
Lemma 13 (Canonical forms). Consider a value v ∈ TERM
S˜
.
Then either v = u, or v = εu :: S˜ with u ∈ TERM
S˜′
and
ε ⊢ S˜′ . S˜. Furthermore:
1. If S˜ = Boolℓ˜ then either v = bℓ˜ or v = εbℓ˜′ :: Boolℓ˜ with
bℓ˜′ ∈ TERMBoolℓ˜′ and ε ⊢ Boolℓ˜′ . Boolℓ˜.
2. If S˜ = S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2 then either v = (λxS˜1 .tS˜2)ℓ˜ with tS˜2 ∈
TERM
S˜2
or v = ε(λxS˜
′
1 .tS˜
′
2)ℓ˜′ :: S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2 with t
S˜′
2 ∈
TERM
S˜′
2
and ε ⊢ S˜′1 →ℓ˜′ S˜
′
2 . S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2.
Proof. By direct inspection of the formation rules of gradual intrin-
sic terms (Figure 4).
Lemma 14 (Ascription preserves relation). Suppose ε ⊢ S˜′ . S˜.
1. If v1 ≈ζ v2 : S˜′ then (εv1 :: S˜) ≈ζ (εv2 :: S˜) : C(S˜).
2. If t1 ≈ζ t2 : C(S˜′) then (εt1 :: S˜) ≈ζ (εt2 :: S˜) : C(S˜).
Proof. Following Zdancewic (2002), the proof proceeds by induc-
tion on the judgment ε ⊢ S˜′ . S˜. The difference here is that con-
sistent subtyping is justified by evidence, and that the terms have
to be ascribed to exploit subtyping. In particular, case 1 above es-
tablishes a computation-level relation because each ascribed term
(εvi :: S˜) may not be a value: each value vi is either a bare value
ui or a casted value εiui :: S˜i, with εi ⊢ Si . S˜. In the latter
case, (ε(εiui :: S˜i) :: S˜) either steps to error (in which case the
relation is vacuously established), or steps to ε′ui :: S˜, which is a
value.
Noninterference follows directly from the following lemma,
which establishes that substitution preserves the logical relations:
Lemma 15 (Substitution preserves relation). If tS˜ ∈ TERM
S˜
,
Γ = FV (tS˜), and Γ ⊢ σ1 ≈ζ σ2, then σ1(tS˜) ≈ζ σ2(tS˜) : C(S˜).
Proof. By induction on the derivation that t ∈ TERM
S˜
. Consider-
ing the last step used in the derivation:
Case (x). tS˜ = xS˜ so Γ = {xS˜}. Γ ⊢ σ1 ≈ζ σ2 implies by
definition that σ1(xS˜) ≈ζ σ2(xS˜) : S˜.
——–
Case (b). tS˜ = bℓ˜. By definition of substitution, σ1(bℓ˜) =
σ2(bℓ˜) = bℓ˜. By definition, bℓ˜ ≈ζ bℓ˜ : Boolℓ˜ as required.
——–
Case (λ). tS˜ = (λxS˜1 .tS˜2)ℓ˜. Then S˜ = S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2.
By definition of substitution, assuming xS˜1 6∈ dom(σi), and
Lemma 11:
σi(t
S˜) = (λxS˜1 .σi(t
S˜2))ℓ˜ ∈ TERMS˜
If ℓ˜ 6 4˜ ζ the result holds trivially because all function values are
related in such a cases. Assume ℓ˜ 4˜ ζ, and assume two values
v1 and v2 such that v1 ≈ζ v2 : S˜′1, with ε2 ⊢ S˜′1 . S˜1. (We
omit the @S˜ operator in applications below since we simply pick
v1 ≈ζ v2 : Boolℓ˜ ⇐⇒ vi ∈ TERMBoolℓ˜ ∧ ℓ˜ 4˜ ζ =⇒ bval(v1) = bval(v2)
v1 ≈ζ v2 : S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2 ⇐⇒ vi ∈ TERMS˜1→ℓ˜S˜2
∧ ℓ˜ 4˜ ζ =⇒ ∀ε1, ε2, S˜′1 →ℓ˜′ S˜
′
2, and S˜′′1 such that
ε1 ⊢ S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2 . S˜
′
1 →ℓ˜′ S˜
′
2 and ε2 ⊢ S˜′′1 . S˜′1, we have:
∀v′1 ≈ζ v
′
2 : S˜
′′
1 . (ε1v1 @
S˜′
1
→
ℓ˜′
S˜′
2 ε2v
′
1) ≈ζ (ε1v2 @
S˜′
1
→
ℓ˜′
S˜′
2 ε2v
′
2) : C(S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜)
t1 ≈ζ t2 : C(S˜) ⇐⇒ ti ∈ TERM
S˜
∧ (t1 7−→
∗ v1 ∧ t2 7−→
∗ v2 =⇒ v1 ≈ζ v2 : S˜)
Figure 6. Gradual security logical relations
S˜ = S˜1 →ℓ˜ S˜2.)
We need to show that:
ε1(λx
S˜1 .σ1(t
S˜2))ℓ˜ ε2v1
≈ζ ε1(λx
S˜1 .σ2(t
S˜2))ℓ˜ ε2v2 : C(S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜)
Each vi is either a bare value ui or a casted value ε2iui :: S˜′1.
In the latter case, the application expression combines evidence,
which may fail with error. If it succeeds, we call the combined
evidence ε′2i. The application rule then applies: it may fail with
error if the evidence ε′2i cannot be combined with the evidence
for the function parameter. In all of the failure cases, the relation
vacuously holds. We therefore consider the only interesting case,
where the applications succeed. We have:
ε1(λx
S˜1 .σi(t
S˜2))ℓ˜ ε
′
2iui
7−→ εr([εaui :: S˜1/x
S˜1 ]σi(t
S˜2)) :: S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜
where εr and εai are the new evidences for the return value and
argument, respectively. We then extend the substitutions to map
xS˜1 to the casted arguments:
σ′i = σi{x
S˜1 7→ εaui :: S˜1}
By Lemma 14.1, (εa1u1 :: S˜1) ≈ζ (εa2u2 :: S˜1) : S˜1
So Γ, xS˜1 ⊢ σ′1 ≈ζ σ′2. By induction hypothesis:
σ′1(t
S˜2) ≈ζ σ
′
2(t
S˜2) : C(S˜2)
By the definition of substitution, this is exactly:
[εau1 :: S˜1/x
S˜1 ]σ1(t
S˜2) ≈ζ [εau2 :: S˜1/x
S˜1 ]σ2(t
S˜2) : C(S˜2)
Finally, since εr ⊢ S˜2 . S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜, by Lemma 14.2:
εr[εau1 :: S˜1/x
S˜1 ]σ1(t
S˜2) :: S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜
≈ζ εr[εau2 :: S˜1/x
S˜1 ]σ2(t
S˜2) :: S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜ : C(S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜)
By backward preservation of the relations (Lemma 12), this implies
that:
ε1(λx
S˜1 .σ1(t
S˜2))ℓ˜ ε2v1
≈ζ ε1(λx
S˜1 .σ2(t
S˜2))ℓ˜ ε2v2 : C(S˜2 ˜≺ ℓ˜)
——–
Case (⊕). tS˜ = ε1tS˜1 ⊕ℓ˜ ε2tS˜2
By definition of substitution and Lemma 11:
σi(t
S˜) = ε1σi(t
S˜1) ⊕ℓ˜ ε2σi(t
S˜2) ∈ TERM
S˜
By induction hypotheses:
σ1(t
S˜1) ≈ζ σ2(t
S˜1) : C(S˜1) and σ1(tS˜2) ≈ζ σ2(tS˜2) : C(S˜2)
By definition of related computations:
σ1(t
S˜1) 7−→∗ v11 ∧ σ2(t
S˜1) 7−→∗ v21 ⇒ v11 ≈ζ v21 : S˜1
σ1(t
S˜2) 7−→∗ v12 ∧ σ2(t
S˜2) 7−→∗ v22 ⇒ v12 ≈ζ v22 : S˜2
By Lemma 13, each vij is either a boolean (bij)ℓ˜ij or a casted
boolean εij(bij)ℓ˜′
ij
:: S˜j . In case a value vij is a casted value,
then the whole term σi(tS˜) can take a step by (Rg), combining εi
with εij . Such a step either fails, or succeeds with a new combined
evidence. Therefore, either:
σi(t
S˜) 7−→∗ error
in which case we do not care since we only consider termination-
insensitive noninterference, or:
σi(t
S˜) 7−→∗ ε′1(bi1)ℓ˜′
i1
⊕ℓ˜ ε′2(bi2)ℓ˜′
i2
7−→ ε′(bi)ℓ˜′
i
:: Boolℓ˜
with bi = bi1J⊕Kbi2 and ℓ˜′i = ℓ˜′i1 ˜≺ ℓ˜′i2. It remains to show that:
(b1)ℓ˜′
1
≈ζ (b2)ℓ˜′
2
: Boolℓ˜
If ℓ˜ 64˜ ζ, then the result holds trivially because all boolean values
are related. If ℓ˜ 4˜ ζ, then also ℓ˜′i 4˜ ζ, which means by definition of
≈ζ on boolean values, that b11 = b21 and b12 = b22, so b1 = b2.
——–
Case (app). tS˜ = ε1tS˜1 @S˜11→ℓ˜S˜12 ε2tS˜2
with ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . S11 →ℓ˜ S12, ε2 ⊢ S˜2 . S˜11, and S˜ = S˜12 ˜≺ ℓ˜.
We omit the @S˜11→ℓ˜S˜12 operator in applications below.
By definition of substitution and Lemma 11:
σi(t
S˜) = ε1σi(t
S˜1) ε2σi(t
S˜2) ∈ TERM
S˜
By induction hypothesis:
σ1(t
S˜1) ≈ζ σ2(t
S˜1) : C(S˜1) and σ1(tS˜2) ≈ζ σ2(tS˜2) : C(S˜2)
By definition of related computations:
σ1(t
S˜1) 7−→∗ v11 ∧ σ2(t
S˜1) 7−→∗ v21 ⇒ v11 ≈ζ v21 : S˜1
σ1(t
S˜2) 7−→∗ v12 ∧ σ2(t
S˜2) 7−→∗ v22 ⇒ v12 ≈ζ v22 : S˜2
By definition of ≈ζ at values of function type, using ε1 and ε2 to
justify the subtyping relations, we have:
(ε1v11 ε2v12) ≈ζ (ε1v21 ε2v22) : C(S˜12 ˜≺ ℓ˜)
——–
Case (if). tS˜ = if ε1tS˜1 then ε2tS˜2 else ε3tS˜3 , with tS˜i ∈
TERM
S˜i
, ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . Boolℓ˜1 and S˜ = (S˜2
˜
<
:
S˜3) ˜≺ ℓ˜1
By definition of substitution:
σi(t
S˜) = if ε1σi(t
S˜1) then ε2σi(t
S˜2) else ε3σi(t
S˜3)
If ℓ˜ 64˜ ζ, then σ1(tS˜) ≈ζ σ2(tS˜) : C(S˜) holds trivially because the
≈ζ relations relate all such well-typed terms. Let us assume ℓ˜ 4˜ ζ.
By the induction hypothesis we have that:
σ1(t
S˜1) ≈ζ σ2(t
S˜1) : C(S˜1)
Assuming σi(tS˜1) 7−→∗ vi1, by the definition of ≈ζ we have:
v11 ≈ζ v21 : S˜1
By Lemma 13, each vi1 is either a boolean (bi1)ℓ˜i1 or a casted
boolean εi1(bi1)ℓ˜′
i1
:: S˜1. In either case, S˜1 . Boolℓ˜1 implies
S˜1 = Boolℓ˜′
1
, so by definition of≈ζ on boolean values, b11 = b21.
In case a value vi1 is a casted value, then the whole term σi(tS˜)
can take a step by (Rg), combining εi with εi1. Such a step either
fails, or succeeds with a new combined evidence. Therefore, either:
σi(t
S˜) 7−→∗ error
in which case we do not care since we only consider termination-
insensitive noninterference, or:
σi(t
S˜) 7−→∗ if ε′1(bi1)ℓ˜′
1
then ε2σi(t
S˜2) else ε3σi(t
S˜3)
Because b11 = b21, both σ1(tS˜) and σ2(tS˜) step into the same
branch of the conditional. Let us assume the condition is true (the
other case is similar). Then:
σi(t
S˜) 7−→ ε2σi(t
S˜2) :: S˜
By induction hypothesis:
σ1(t
S˜2) ≈ζ σ2(t
S˜2) : C(S˜2)
Assume σi(tS˜2) 7−→∗ vi2, then v12 ≈ζ v22 : S˜2. Since ε2 ⊢ S˜2 .
S˜, by Lemma 14 we have:
(ε2σ1(t
S˜2) :: S˜) ≈ζ (ε2σ2(t
S˜2) :: S˜) :: C(S˜)
——–
Case (::). tS˜ = εtS˜1 :: S˜, with tS˜1 ∈ TERM
S˜1
and ε1 ⊢ S˜1 . S˜.
By definition of substitution:
σi(t
S˜) = ε1σi(t
S˜1) :: S˜
By induction hypothesis:
σ1(t
S˜1) ≈ζ σ2(t
S˜1) : C(S˜1)
The result follows directly by Lemma 14.
5. Related Work and Conclusion
The design of a gradual security-typed language is a novel con-
tribution. Despite the fact that both Disney and Flanagan (2011)
and Fennell and Thiemann (2013) have proposed languages for se-
curity typing dubbed gradual, they do not propose gradual source
languages. Rather, the language designs require explicit security
casts—which can also be encoded with a label test expression in
Jif (Zheng and Myers 2007). Furthermore, both designs treat an
unlabeled type as having the top label, then allowing explicit casts
downward in the security lattice. This design is analogous to the
internal language of the quasi-static typing approach. In that ap-
proach, explicit casts work well, but the external language there
accepts too many programs. That difficulty was the original moti-
vation for consistency in gradual typing (Siek and Taha 2006).
Thiemann and Fennell (2014) develop a generic approach to
gradualize annotated type systems. This is similar to security typing
(labels are one kind of annotation), except that they only consider
annotation on base types, and the language only includes explicit
casts, like the gradual security work discussed above. They track
blame and provide a translation that removes unnecessary casts.
Acknowledgments We thank Matı´as Toro for feedback and con-
tributing the proofs of Propositions 1 and 2 in Appendix A.
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A. Auxiliary Proofs
Proposition 1. If Γ ⊢ t : S then Γ ⊢Z t : S.
Proof. By induction on Γ ⊢ t : S.
As most of the type rules are identical, most of the cases are
straightforward. The exceptions to this are the (Sif) and (Sapp)
rules.
Case (Sif). Then
D =
D0
Γ ⊢ t0 : Boolℓ
D1
Γ ⊢ t1 : S1
D2
Γ ⊢ t2 : S2
Γ ⊢ if t0 then t1 else t2 : (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ
By Lemma 16, S1 <: (S1 <
:
S2) and S2 <: (S1 <
:
S2), and by
Lemma 17 (S1 <
:
S2) <: (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ℓ, therefore S1 <: (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ
and S2 <: (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ.
Combining these with the induction hypotheses, we get
E =
E0
Γ ⊢Z t0 : Boolℓ
Ei
Γ ⊢Z ti : Si Si <: (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ
Γ ⊢Z ti : (Si <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ
Γ ⊢Z if t0 then t1 else t2 : (S1 <
:
S2) ≺ ℓ
Case (Sapp). Then t = t1 t2 and Γ ⊢ t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ for some S12
and ℓ such that Γ ⊢ t1 : S11 →ℓ S12, Γ ⊢ t2 : S2 and S2 <: S11.
Using induction hypothesis on t2 we know that Γ ⊢Z t2 : S2. As
S2 <: S11. Then by (λSEC-SUB) Γ ⊢Z t2 : S11. Using induction
hypothesis on t1, Γ ⊢Z t1 : S11 →ℓ S12, then by (λSEC-APP) we
conclude that Γ ⊢Z t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
Lemma 16. Let S1, S2 ∈ TYPE. Then
1. If (S1 <: S2) is defined then S1 <: (S1 <: S2).
2. If (S1
<
: S2) is defined then (S1
<
: S2) <: S1.
Proof. We start by proving (1) assuming that (S1 ≺ S2) is defined.
We proceed by case analysis on S1.
Case (Boolℓ). If S1 = Boolℓ1 then as (S1 <
:
S2) is defined then
S2 must have the form Boolℓ2 for some ℓ2. Therefore (S1 <
:
S2) =
Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2). But by definition of 4, ℓ1 4 (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) and therefore
we use (<:Bool) to conclude that Boolℓ1 <: Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2), i.e.
S1 <: (S1 <
:
S2).
Case (S →ℓ S). If S1 = S11 →ℓ1 S12 then as (S1 <
:
S2) is defined
then S2 must have the form S21 →ℓ2 S22 for some S21, S22 and
ℓ2.
We also know that (S1 <
:
S2) = (S11
<
: S21)→(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) (S12
<
: S22).
By definition of4, ℓ1 4 (ℓ1 ≺ℓ2). Also, as (S1 <
:
S2) is defined then
(S11
<
: S21) is defined. Using the induction hypothesis of (2) on S11,
(S11
<
: S21) <: S11. Also, using the induction hypothesis of (1) on
S12 we also know that S12 <: (S12
<
: S22). Then by (<:→) we can
conclude that S11 →ℓ1 S12 <: (S11
<
: S21)→(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) (S12
<
: S22),
i.e. S1 <: (S1 <
:
S2).
The proof of (2) is similar to (1) but using the argument that
(ℓ1
≺
ℓ2) 4 ℓ1.
Lemma 17. Let S ∈ TYPE and ℓ ∈ LABEL. Then S <: S ≺ ℓ.
Proof. Straigthforward case analysis on type S using the fact that
ℓ 4 (ℓ′ ≺ ℓ) for any ℓ′.
Lemma 18. Let S1, S2 ∈ TYPE such that S1 <: S2, and let
ℓ1, ℓ2 ∈ LABEL such that ℓ1 4 ℓ2. Then S1 ≺ ℓ1 <: S2 ≺ ℓ2.
Proof. Straightforward case analysis on type S using the definition
of label stamping on types.
Proposition 2. If Γ ⊢Z t : S Then Γ ⊢ t : S′ for some S′ <: S.
Proof. By induction on derivations of Γ ⊢Z t : S.
We proceed by case analysis on t (modulo (λSEC-SUB)). As
most of the type rules are identical, most of the cases are straight-
forward. The exception to this is case (λSEC-COND) and (λSEC-
APP):
Case (λSEC-COND). Then t = if t′ then t1 else t2 and
Γ ⊢Z if t′ then t1 else t2 : Sz ≺ ℓ for some Sz, and l such that
Γ ⊢Z t′ : Boolℓ, Γ ⊢
Z t1 : S ≺ ℓ and Γ ⊢Z t2 : S ≺ ℓ.
Using induction hypothesis on the premises we also know that
Γ ⊢ t′ : Boolℓ′ for some ℓ′ 4 ℓ, Γ ⊢ t1 : S′1 for some S′1 <: S ≺ ℓ,
and Γ ⊢ t2 : S′2 for some S′2 <: S ≺ ℓ.
By (Sif), Γ ⊢ if t′ then t1 else t2 : (S′1 ≺ S′2) ≺ ℓ′. Then by
Lemma 16 we know that (S′1 ≺ S′2) <: Sz, and by Lemma 18 if we
choose S′ = (S′1 ≺S′2) ≺ℓ′, we conclude that (S′1 ≺S′2) ≺ℓ′ <: Sz ≺ℓ,
i.e. S′ <: S.
Case (λSEC-APP). Then t = t1 t2 and Γ ⊢Z t1 t2 : S12 ≺ ℓ
for some S12 and ℓ such that Γ ⊢Z t1 : S11 →ℓ S12 and
Γ ⊢Z t2 : S11.
Using induciton hypothesis on the premises we also know that
Γ ⊢ t1 : S
′
11 →ℓ′ S
′
12 for some S′11, S′12 and ℓ′ such that
S11 <: S
′
11, S
′
12 <: S12 and ℓ′ 4 ℓ, and that Γ ⊢ t2 : S′′12 such that
S′′11 <: S11. By transitivity on subtyping then S′′11 <: S′11. Then
by (Sapp) Γ ⊢ t1 t2 : S′12 ≺ ℓ′ and by Lemma 18 if we choose
S′ = S′12 ≺ ℓ
′
, we conclude that S′12 ≺ ℓ′ <: S12 ≺ ℓ, i.e. S′ <: S.
Lemma 19. Let S1, S2 and S3 ∈ TYPE.
1. If (S1 <: S2) is defined, S1 <: S3 and S1 <: S3 then (S1 <:
S2) <: S3.
2. If (S1
<
: S2) is defined, S3 <: S1 and S3 <: S2 then S3 <:
(S1
<
: S2).
Proof. We start by proving (1) by case analysis on type (S1 <: S2).
Case (Boolℓ). As (S1 <:S2) is defined then S1 = Boolℓ1 and S2 =
Boolℓ2 for some ℓ1 and ℓ2. Also as S1 <: S3, then S3 = Boolℓ3
for some ℓ3. By (<:Bool), ℓ1 4 ℓ3 and ℓ2 4 ℓ3 then by definition of
≺, (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) 4 ℓ3. Then (S1 <
:
S2) = Bool(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) <: Boolℓ3 , i.e.
(S1 <
:
S2) <: S3.
Case (S →ℓ S). As (S1 <: S2) is defined then S1 = S11 →ℓ1 S12
and S2 = S21 →ℓ1 S22 for some S11, S12, S21, S22, ℓ1 and ℓ2.
Also as S1 <: S3, then S3 = S31 →ℓ3 S32 for some S31, S32
and ℓ3. By (<:→), S31 <: S11, S12 <: S32, S31 <: S21, S22 <:
S32, ℓ1 4 ℓ3 and ℓ2 4 ℓ3.
Then (S1 <
:
S2) = (S11
<
: S21) →(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) (S12
<
: S22). By
using induction hypothesis (2) then S31 <: (S11
<
: S21) and by
using induction hypothesis (1) then (S12
<
: S22) <: S32. Also by
definition of ≺, (ℓ1 ≺ ℓ2) 4 ℓ3. Finally by (<:→) we conclude
that (S11
<
: S21) →(ℓ1 ≺ℓ2) (S12
<
: S22) <: S31 →ℓ3 S32, i.e.
(S1 <
:
S2) <: S3.
The proof of (2) is similar to (1) but using the argument that if
ℓ3 4 ℓ1 and ℓ3 4 ℓ2 then ℓ3 4 (ℓ1
≺
ℓ2).
